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1. INTRODUCTION
T RADITIONALLY, discussions of space law have dealt mainly with the
upward extent of national sovereignty. For practical reasons, the ques-
tion has been deferred in the interest of reaching an early international
agreement on the legal control of outer space.' Now the U-2 flights above
the Soviet Union have again brought it to the fore with critical urgency.
We can now foresee, furthermore, that surveillance by satellites and
other spacecraft will soon take the limelight in international affairs. The
first practical spacecraft will probably be satellites used for surveillance.
Their standard use is expected to begin by 1965. In view of technical devel-
opments, vertical surveillance will soon no longer be limited significantly by
height or speed.
In the United States, there are already several programs for surveillance
satellites, as well as for other types of satellites with surveillance capabili-
ties. The best known of these are TIROS, MIDAS and SAMOS. TIROS, a
weather satellite, was first launched into orbit on April 1, 1960; MIDAS,
an infrared missile-detector, on May 24, 1960. The first SAMOS, a true
surveillance satellite, is scheduled to be launched in late 1960.
TIROS was designed for scientific purposes only, to gather data on
cloud formations and other weather phenomena. Still, TIROS pictures do
show large terrain features. For example, TIROS detected colored rain in
Turkey, as well as dust storms in the Balkans and great dark clouds of dust
in the Krasnodar region and the southern Ukraine.2
TIROS has shown the feasibility of satellite surveillance, and is the
forerunner of true surveillance satellites. It may be said to have opened the
fateful era of surveillance from outer space.
The Soviet Union has not officially objected to any satellite launchings,
including those of TIROS and MIDAS.3
Though aerial and satellite surveillance raise different legal issues-as
will be shown in the following discussion-their practical applications are
separated by a rather thin line. In particular, there is no great difference
between aircraft and spacecraft in their ability to conduct surveillance.
NOTE: Footnotes follow end of article on Pages 116 to 118.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
2. SURVEILLANCE FROM OUTER SPACE
Existing international flight agreements refer to sovereignty only in
the airspace over national territory, and hence do not apply, in their terms,
to outer space. Today, the only generally accepted agreement of this kind is
the Chicago Convention.4 Article 1 of the Chicago Convention provides that
"Every state has complete and exclusive jurisdiction over the airspace
above its territory."
The Convention does not define "airspace" or any equivalent term. The
related term "aircraft," however, is defined in later Annexes5 in language
adopted from the Paris Convention of 19196 as
"Any machine which can derive support in the atmosphere from the
reactions of the air."
This definition is not literally applicable to satellites or other spacecraft.
Satellites derive no support from the air or otherwise, but are in free fall
around the earth.
The domestic flight legislation of many countries, including the United
States and the Soviet Union, is similarly limited to "airspace" or "aircraft."
In the Air Commerce Act of 1926, for example, the term "aircraft" is
defined as
"Any contrivance now known or hereafter invented, used or designed
for navigation or flight in the air."7
Although this appears somewhat broader than the definition contained in
the, Annexes to the Chicago Convention, it applies to domestic and not to
international flight. Within this limitation, the term "air" as used in Ameri-
can statutory law is apparently subject to the same ambiguity as the term
"airspace" in the Chicago Convention. Article 1 of the Air Code of the USSR
asserts complete and exclusive sovereignty in the airspace (vozdushnoye
prostrantsvo) above the Soviet Union;8 but no definition of the term "air-
space" has been found in the Code or elsewhere in Soviet law.
No nation has yet objected to.the orbiting of artificial satellites above
its territory. Several explanations of this fact have been suggested. For
example, as long as the International Geophysical Year continued, it could
be said that implied consent had been given to the flight of scientific and
peaceful satellites. According to this argument, the early satellite flights
were sanctioned by an implied international agreement based on the acquies-
cence of other governments in the announcements by the United States and
the Soviet Union that satellites would be launched in connection with the
International Geophysical Year. Another suggested explanation is that the
lack of objection to the early satellite flights established a new precedent in
international law. This is, however, a minority view. A simpler and more
widely accepted explanation is that satellite flights are not considered viola-
tions of international law because satellites are not "aircraft" within the
meaning of the Chicago Convention and their passage through "airspace"
(in any reasonable sense of that term) is merely incidental.
Missiles, in contrast, pass through "airspace" during a substantial part
of their flight. Their passage through "airspace" on their return to the
earth is by no means incidental; it is the purpose for which they were
launched.
In summary, the weight of qualified opinion now holds that air sover-
eignty as established by the Chicago Convention is limited to the atmos-
phere, 9 though no one can say how high it extends. Pending an international
agreement on the subject, there are thus at present no special prohibitions
or restrictions on space flight. The question, then, is one of policy rather
than law: What legal rules should govern activities in outer space? The
chief alternatives that have been proposed are (1) freedom of passage for
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all uses and (2) freedom of passage but only for certain purposes and
subject to specified conditions.
If outer space remains free for all purposes, as under existing law, there
can be no legal objection to surveillance satellites. If its use is restricted
by international agreement to "peaceful purposes" only, on the other hand,
satellite surveillance may or may not be permitted, according to what is
meant by "peaceful purposes."
It is the policy of the United States, declared in the National Aeronautics
and Space Act of 1958, that "activities in space should be devoted to peaceful
purposes for the benefit of mankind."'10 In the same Act, however, Congress
provided for the conduct of certain space activities by the Department of
Defense and the armed services." This provision for military space activi-
ties and the simultaneous declaration that outer space should be devoted to
peaceful purposes indicate that the term "peaceful," within the meaning of
the Act, applies to some military as well as civilian uses of outer space.
One of the principal architects of the National Aeronautics and Space
Act has observed that
"... The word 'peaceful' as used in the Act means 'non-aggressive'
rather than 'non-military.'
". If 'peaceful' means 'non-military,' and outer space can be used
for 'peaceful' purposes only, what happens to the inherent right of self-
defense guaranteed by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and by
general international law?"12
The Committee on the Law of Outer Space established by the American
Bar Association, in its report to the House of Delegates at the 1959 Con-
vention, took a similar view of the term "peaceful" as applied to the uses
of outer space:
"In the sense of the [United Nations] charter, and in international
law generally, it is employed in contradistinction to 'aggressive.' . . . Thus
any use of space which did not itself constitute an attack upon, or threat
against, the territorial integrity and independence of another State would
be permissible. .... 11
As a practical matter, the range of activities in outer space will be
narrow indeed if all that lend themselves to military purposes are prohibited.
For example, a radio satellite can relay military as well as private, commer-
cial and scientific messages. Are the benefits of reliable worldwide com-
munications, and the easing of overtaxed frequencies, to be denied on that
account? Are we also to forgo the use of satellites for the navigation of
ships and aircraft, for weather forecasting and for ice and forest-fire patrol,
on the ground that they lend themselves to military applications? Any such
sweeping rejection would largely deprive mankind of the benefits to be
derived from the use of outer space.
3. AIR SOVEREIGNTY AND HIGH-ALTITUDE SURVEILLANCE
Difficult questions arise if surveillance is conducted by very high-altitude
flight craft. This problem seems likely to grow with the progress of flight
technology. A number of flight devices have been conceived that would be
difficult to classify as either aircraft or spacecraft. For example, a device
known as the glide rocket would be boosted into outer space by rocket power
and would then glide back to earth through the atmosphere; another, known
as the skip rocket, would alternately descend from outer space into the
atmosphere, and then turn upward into outer space, like a flat stone skipping
over the surface of a pond. 14 The prototype of such vehicles is the X-15,
which has already made a number of successful flights.
The disparity between air law and space law appears to be an unavoid-
able problem that cannot be postponed indefinitely. If different rules are
applied to airspace and outer space, the absence of any dividing line between
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the two will lead to jurisdictional conflict. How serious this kind of conflict
may become is shown by the recent U-2 flights above the Soviet Union.
The U-2 episode provides material for a current case study of high-
altitude surveillance in international law. Let us first review the facts.
On May 1, 1960, an American aircraft flew some 1400 miles over Soviet
territory. According to press reports, it was tracked by American radar.
After descending to some 27,000 feet, it disappeared from the radar screen. 15
The Soviet Government later announced the capture of the plane, its equip-
ment (including a camera) and its pilot.
According to the American State Department, U-2 flights have been
made "along the frontiers of the Free World" for the past four years. They
have been generally discussed in the public press. In early 1958, for example,
an American monthly magazine described the U-2 as capable of "long-range
photographic reconnaissance" and reported that it had been "flying across
the Iron Curtain."' 6
Apparently the Soviet Government already knew of the U-2 flights from
direct evidence. In his first public reference to the subject, 17 Khrushchev
mentioned a U-2 flight over Soviet territory on April 9, 1960, from the
direction of Afghanistan. He later referred to a similar flight occurring in
1956.18 Still later, he said he had almost brought the subject up during his
talks with President Eisenhower at Camp David in the fall of 1959.19 By
these statements he clearly implied that he had known about the U-2 flights
for some time.
It thus appears that aerial reconnaissance of Soviet territory has been
carried out for years with the knowledge of the Soviet Government and
with impunity,
Prior to the incident of May 1, 1960, the Soviet Union had never pro-
tested-in fact, had never admitted knowledge of-U-2 reconnaissance
flights over its territory. Thereafter, however, it strongly protested the
flights as violations of its sovereign airspace, 20 and as acts of aggression
and espionage.
Is it reasonable to assume, as the Soviet Union asserts, that these U-2
flights were violations of international law? Or is the question open for
further inquiry? Can the Soviet Union claim to make the assertion at all,
in view of the fact that it has never adhered to the Chicago Convention? 21
Matters of policy are excluded from the following discussion. For exam-
ple, no effort will be made to consider whether the U-2 flight of May 1, 1960
was an intrusion, an unfriendly act or a breach of comity, or whether official
statements concerning it were well advised.2 2 As to all such matters, no
inference is intended or warranted. They merely lie beyond the scope of legal
analysis. By such exclusions it may be possible to clarify certain facets of
the problem, and to avoid an overcharged atmosphere in which each side
would encourage the other to overstate its case.
A. The Question of Air Sovereignty
For purposes of this discussion, it is immaterial whether the U-2 flights
were violations of Soviet domestic law. Like the United States, the Soviet
Union in its domestic law has never recognized any upper limit to the
airspace above its territory. But, in accordance with the maxim, par in
parem non habet imperium, no State can be subject to another's municipal
law.
There are persuasive reasons for challenging the view that the U-2
flights over Soviet territory were violations of international law. It seems
necessary to stress, in particular, that there is no applicable agreement
between the United States and the Soviet Union concerning the use of
airspace.
From the previous discussion, it will be recalled that today the only
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generally accepted international flight agreement is the Chicago Convention.
But the Chicago Convention has never been signed by the Soviet Union.
Should other States be bound to recognize the air sovereignty of the Soviet
Union, which is not bound by international law to recognize theirs?
We may inquire also whether the U-2 flights invaded Soviet "airspace"
as that term is used in the Chicago Convention. From the previous discus-
sion, it will be recalled that the Convention does not define "airspace" or
any equivalent term.
Since the upper boundaries of airspace remain unsettled under inter-
national law, their proper location has been much debated. In fact, it is the
commonest and almost inevitable subject in the literature of space law.
There is wide agreement that there must be an upper limit to national
sovereignty. There is, however, no agreement on what the limit should be.
The proposed upper limits to national sovereignty all seem more or less
arbitrary. Neither physical conditions nor flight characteristics can be rea-
sonably related to any fixed altitude. Satellite observations have shown that
air density at high altitudes fluctuates from place to place and from time
to time.23 Furthermore, the least density that can support winged aircraft
will vary with the progress of flight technology.
Under most proposals, sovereignty would end at the top of the atmos-
phere. This is sometimes taken to be the biological limit for man without
special equipment.24 It is normal practice to use oxygen equipment at an
altitude of about two miles. At a much higher altitude-about 62,000 feet,
or less than 12 miles-water boils at body temperature. For human survival
above that point, breathing apparatus must be supplemented by a pressure
suit.
According to Soviet accounts, the U-2 flight of May 1, 1960 was made at
some 68,000 feet. 25 In any event, the U-2 was designed to fly at a height of
more than 12 miles.2 6 This is higher than man can breathe and beyond the
boiling altitude of water at body temperature. It is also far higher than
the weather balloons of 1956 to which the Soviet Union objected not only as
invasions of sovereign airspace but as dangers to aerial navigation.27 Objects
at U-2 cruising altitudes would not interfere with any normal use of the air,
even by military aircraft.
From the previous discussion it will be further recalled that, although
the Chicago Convention does not define "airspace," the related term "air-
craft" is defined in later Annexes to the Convention.28 But the Annexes
containing this definition were never made part of the Chicago Convention,
nor separately ratified by the United States., The definition itself was adopted
from the Paris Convention of 1919 29 -which the United States has never
ratified. Furthermore, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO),
created by the Chicago Convention, has the power to amend a definition or
classification contained in an annex. 0 How could the United States be bound
by a definition to which it has never agreed and which can be changed at
any time by administrative action of an international agency ?31
Between signatory States, if the definition of "aircraft" contained in
the Annexes can be regarded as part of the Convention itself, the most
reasonable interpretation may be that airspace, within the meaning of the
Convention, extends upward to a height at which the atmosphere becomes
too thin to support winged aircraft. As the previous discussion has pointed
out, however, the qualifications just stated do not apply to disputes between
the Soviet Union and the United States. To repeat, the Soviet Union is not a
signatory; the Annexes containing the definitions of "aircraft" were never
made a part of the Convention; and the United States has never ratified
either those Annexes or the Paris Convention from which the definition
was adopted.
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Two other matters call for comment.
First, it is sometimes said that the Chicago Convention was never
intended to regulate anything but conventional civil aircraft 32-in particu-
lar, therefore, not surveillance aircraft. This interpretation is open to
question, especially in view of article 3(c), which refers to "State aircraft."
On the other hand, article 3(c) could hardly have been intended to confer
benefits on non-signatory States. Moreover, there is doubt whether article
3(c) would apply to suveillance aircraft. The term "State aircraft" as
defined in article 3 of the Chicago Convention "appears to exclude aircraft
owned by a State and employed by it in some strictly governmental func-
tions"383 such as civil aeronautics control and diplomatic travel.
Secondly, although the Chicago Convention recognized the principle of
air sovereignty, its main purpose according to some historians was to make
exceptions to that principle in favor of a right of passage.3 4 In any event,
the purpose of the United States in calling the 1944 Conference on Inter-
national Civil Aviation was stated by the chief of the American delegation
as follows':
"A general system of rights for planes to travel and to carry inter-
national commerce should be set up, becoming the established custom of
commerce by air as similar arrangements have become settled law by
sea."35
On the other hand, the Chicago Convention, like the Paris Convention before
it, represented a compromise between air sovereignty and freedom of
passage. In the end, only a modified right of innocent passage was provided
by the so-called Two Freedoms Agreement,8 6 which was adopted at the
same time as the Chicago Convention. It would be difficult to say, therefore,
whether the "main" purpose of the Convention was to confirm or to limit
the principle of air sovereignty.
It may be asked if the U-2 flights, even though not forbidden by the
Chicago Convention or other specific agreements, violated customary inter-
national law. There are several objections to this view. It assumes a long-
continued accumulation of unbroken precedents by which nations acquiesce
in practice to the impenetrability of one another's airspace. But does this
assumption fit the facts? It is doubtful if a year has passed since 1944 (the
date of the Chicago Convention) without an intrusion into the airspace
above a sovereign State.87 Moreover, changes in international law by tacit
agreement require a rather long time. For example, freedom of the seas did
not become a generally accepted principle of international law for hundreds
of years. In contrast, international flights are relatively new in world
affairs. The rule of air sovereignty in particular dates from the Paris Con-
vention of 1919. It was not approved by the Institute of International Law
until 1927.38 Earlier, Fauchille had written that "there is no rule of inter-
national law authorizing any country to subject the airspace to its sover-
eignty." He referred to customary international law, since there were then
no international flight agreements.3 9
Is airspace recognized as part-of the sovereign territory of a State, under
article 2 of the Chicago Convention, which defines the "territory" of a
State as its "land areas and territorial waters adjacent thereto"? By implica-
tion, this definition seems to indicate that, under customary international
law, the airspace above a State is not a part of its territory and hence not
subject to its sovereignty except by specific agreement.
In any event, it could hardly be argued that customary international
law has recognized the upward extension of air sovereignty to extreme alti-
tudes above the normal or even possible flight of then-existing aircraft. The
fact that foreign aircraft had never flown at such altitudes would merely
prove their inability to do so, and not the acquiescence of their governments
in any given upper limit of national airspace.
SURVEILLANCE AIRCRAFT AND SATELLITES
There is still another reason than has yet been mentioned for doubting
if the U-2 flights :invaded Soviet airspace. The bounds of sovereignty are set
by the principle of effective control. Sovereignty cannot go farther than
effective control in the sense of power to exclude, though it need not go
so far.40
This principle of jurisprudence underlies the historic pronouncements of
Grotius41 and Fauchille42 that the high seas and the air, respectively, were
free by their very nature because they were not susceptible of dominion.
Effective control was evidently lacking as to all the U-2 flights above the
Soviet Union-even the last such flight, at its prescribed altitude.
The Soviet Union itself appears to have accepted effective control as the
limit of its three-dimensional sovereignty, by not objecting to the earlier
U-2 flights.
As for the last such flight, available information suggests that the plane
came down from cruising altitude because of a flameout or other failure, and
entered Soviet airspace unintentionally. If we are to judge the legal conse-
quences of this flight by the provisions of international agreements such as
the Chicago Convention to which the Soviet Union is not a party, then
surely the controlling provisions are those that permit an aircraft to enter
foreign territory in case of distress.
The foregoing considerations indicate that the U-2 flights were not inva-
sions of Soviet airspace. The purpose of discussing the question at length
has not been to pass judgment; it has been merely to point out the legal
basis for such flights, and to throw light on the problem of satellite sur-
veillance.
B. The Question. of Espionage
Consider next whether the U-2 flights were acts of espionage under inter-
national law, since this question may later be raised as to surveillance
satellites.
As defined by the Hague Convention, to which both the United States
and the Soviet Union are parties, espionage involves the collection of infor-
mation clandestinely or under false pretenses.4 3 It is possible, of course, for
high-altitude surveillance to be so conducted as to constitute espionage. The
U-2 flights, however, were not clandestine-unless something is wrong with
Soviet radar. Nor were they made under false pretenses (misrepresented,
for example, as the flights of civilian airliners). As the previous discussion
has pointed out, they had long been reported in the public press and known
to the Soviet Government as photographic missions. On May 7, 1960, Secre-
tary of State Herter publicly classified them as "aerial surveillance by
unarmed civilian aircraft."
The foregoing definition of espionage, contained in the Hague Conven-
tion, conforms to general usage and understanding. In a recent comment
on the "Long-Range Lessons of the U-2 Affair," Telford Taylor (certainly
not an apologist for the Eisenhower Administration) defines espionage as
"The quest for closely guarded official information by undercover
agents, who customarily employ bribery, impersonation, theft, or other
deceptive and clandestine means."44
He concludes that
"The U-2 flights, in short, were not espionage in the conventional
sense." 45
Furthermore, espionage is a domestic and not an international wrong.
It begs the question to say that high-altitude surveillance may violate the
domestic law of the Soviet Union or of other countries.4 6 The sending of
espionage agents into another State in time of peace is not recognized as a
wrong under international law.
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"Although all States constantly or occasionally send spies abroad, and
although it is not considered urong morally, legally or politically to do so,
such agents have, of course, no recognized position whatever according to
international law, since they are not agents of States for their interna-
tional relations. '47 (Italics supplied)
Even in time of war, "... it has always been considered lawful to employ
spies . ",48
It may be observed, also, that espionage is condoned by custom and tacitly
accepted by long-continued international practice and forbearance., This is
not said for reasons of recrimination (he who is without this sin among you,
let him cast the first stone). As we can all see for ourselves, espionage has
long been tolerated under customary international law. From this point of
view, we need only consider the record of ordinary espionage on the ground.
Shortly after the U-2 incident, a well known Soviet writer who is a deputy
member of the Supreme Soviet told a public meeting in London that spying
is a routine business.4 9 All the great powers accept and practice espionage,
as a necessary part of national defense.
Indeed, it would be difficult to draw a significant line between aerial
surveillance and many recognized methods of collecting information abroad.
In normal diplomatic practice, all the principal nations exchange military
attaches who gather military intelligence. High-altitude aircraft flying over
friendly lands or international waters can use air-sampling techniques to
detect nuclear explosions on foreign soil, and can make recordings of foreign
radio and radar transmissions. In addition, it has long been possible to peer
across the frontiers of another country by means of radar. Although it
might well be considered a penetration of territorial integrity, radar scrutiny
is apparently accepted by all nations. But how does it differ in principle
from aerial surveillance? Pulses of radio energy are detectable physical
phenomena projected into the airspace of another country. What does it
matter that they cannot be perceived by the unaided senses? Under most
conditions, neither can high-altitude aircraft or satellites.
C. The Question of Aggression
Finally, consider whether the U-2 flights were acts of aggression. This
question, also, like that of espionage, may later be raised as to surveillance
satellites.
For practical purposes, the question is already foreclosed. On May 27,
1960, the Security Council of the United Nations exonerated the United
States from a Soviet charge of aggression based on the last U-2 flight over
Soviet territory. The vote was 7 to 2, with 2 abstentions.50
Even Khrushchev, though he referred to the U-2 flight of May 1, 1960,
as an aggressive act, said it was not "an act of true aggression and war.""'
On principle, "aggression" implies initial attack. Surveillance is not
attack.
Were the U-2 flights offensive in purpose? According to public state-
ments by President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Herter, they were
intended to provide against the possibility of surprise attack by others. The
necessity of providing against surprise attack results in part from the
fundamental declared policy that the United States will never strike the first
blow-in short, that it will never be an aggressor.
In fact, the main function of such high-altitude surveillance is to deter
aggression by giving timely warning of its occurrence. This is a peaceful
purpose.
On principle, it is easy to distinguish between surveillance vehicles and
those that carry weapons. The distinction can be stated in general terms.
Surveillance aircraft and spacecraft are extensions of the senses, not of the
teeth and claws. They are equipped to receive impressions, not to do harm.
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On the other hand, it must be recognized that a given act of surveillance
may appear ambiguous. The absence of aggressive intent may not be appar-
ent, Thus it is said that surveillance aircraft may carry nuclear bombs. It is
equally true that surveillance submarines or ships may carry nuclear mis-
siles. This possibility is a cause of real concern.
Unless the absence of aggressive intent is reasonably apparent, any
given act of peaceful surveillance fails in its purpose, since it may provoke
the very attack it is intended to deter.
On the other hand, aircraft do not present so great a problem in this
respect as spacecraft or submarines. Under normal conditions, any country
detecting an aerial intruder can identify it by interception. The U-2 in
particular is an unarmed gliderlike aircraft that could not easily be mistaken
for a bomber.
A Soviet legal writer, Y. Korovin, has recently argued that the U-2
flights above Soviet territory violated article 1 of the United Nations Char-
ter, which forbids aggression. 52 The reasons given by Korovin deserve
analysis.
According to a definition of aggression proposed by the Soviet Union
in 1933 and recorded in certain treaties, says Korovin, an "aggressor" is
a State "whose land, naval or air forces are landed or brought within the
bounds of another State without the permission of its Government."53 This
definition does not apply literally to the surveillance flights of U-2s, which
are unarmed civilian aircraft. But the civilian character of U-2 aircraft,
Korovin argues,
"Does not alter matters. Whatever category a plane formally belongs
to, its character is determined by the function it performs .... ,,54
If Korovin is right, why is it that the Soviet Union did not propose, or the
treaties mentioned in his article incorporate, a definition of aggression
couched in terms of purpose?
Korovin's argument seems to assume that high-altitude surveillance is
necessarily aggressive-an assumption that the previous discussion over-
turns and Korovin makes no attempt to prove.
Furthermore, the Soviet definition of aggression given by Korovin
requires that foreign forces come "within the bounds" of another State.
Korovin thus begs the whole question whether the U-2 flights invaded Soviet
airspace. 55
4. CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion has dealt with the problem of national sover-
eignty in relation to surveillance from outer space and the upper atmosphere.
The dangers of delay in resolving the problem are clear: events may get out
of control; claims and interests may crystallize through custom, making
international agreement more difficult. On the other hand, every nation
with a stake in outer space will be loath to forgo advantages it may have
or can acquire.
The result is a policy dilemma. Would it be in the best interests of the
United States or of the Soviet Union if (a) neither or (b) both were free
to use outer space for surveillance as well as for other peaceful purposes?
The solution of this question should be prayerfully sought by those best able
to understand the full implications including the consequences for national
security.5 6 The following comments are merely suggestive.
Freedom of information is a fundamental Western tradition. From the
beginning of its history, the United States has found it best for itself as
well as others to know the truth and to let the truth be known. Accordingly,
it would at least be out of character for the United States to agree to a ban
on spacecraft equipped exclusively for acquiring information. 57
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Korovin stated in January, 1959, that the sending of an American recon-
naissance satellite through outer space above Soviet territory would be
regarded as an unfriendly act but not an act of war. He further indicated,
however, that the intentional destruction of a Soviet satellite by the United
States would be regarded as an act of war. 58
It may well be that the Soviet Union as well as the United States would
stand to gain from freedom of surveillance. For mutual deterrence may not
continue to keep the peace unless each side can obtain reliable information
at all times that the other is not preparing for imminent attack. Interna-
tional surveillance would also provide safeguards against unintentional war.
We should observe, in addition, that a ban on surveillance satellites
would not dependably protect any country against foreign satellite observa-
tion, without an enforceable system of inspection and control. Unless such
inspection and control are accepted, agreement on satellite surveillance is
unlikely. If they are accepted, it is true, there will be little need for satellite
surveillance. On the other hand, surveillance from outer space may facilitate
inspection and control of armaments.
The impact of space surveillance on world affairs will almost certainly
be profound. In retrospect, the U-2 flights appear not as an isolated episode
but as the first link in a chain of novel events whose end no one can now
foresee. Without a doubt, they show the need for reconciling traditional
concepts of air sovereignty with the facts of technological change.
There is abundant evidence that practical satellite surveillance lies no
more than a few years away. When that time comes, apart from traffic prob-
lems, will any nation object to surveillance from lower levels?
With the current controversy over high-altitude aerial surveillance and
the looming prospect of surveillance from outer space, the conclusion of an
international agreement on the legal control of outer space can not much
longer be deferred. The probability is that the secrecy and sealed borders
of the past are doomed, either by virtue of such an agreement or through
the continued lack of it in the face of increasing capabilities for satellite
surveillance. If so, the question for the future will be-not whether surveil-
lance aircraft or satellites shall continue to fly over other countries, but-
whether an enforceable and mutually advantageous agreement can be
reached on the uses of outer space.
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